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This paper is based on preliminary results of a research project on social integra-
tion and collective identities in certain multiethnic settings in Croatia. Generally, 
a distinction is drawn between two main forms of peace in multiethnic settings. 
The first one relates to the existence of peace in the places that maintained their 
peace and integrity amid the spread of ethnic violence in their surroundings. 
The second form of peace is much more frequent, as it relates to the whole 
scale of post-conflict processes. Next, a typology is proposed, distinguishing 
multiethnic peace and conflict areas in Croatia, where the former are the areas 
where no violent conflicts happened in the 1990s, and the latter areas where re-
turn of refugees, mostly Serbs, is taking place as an aftermath to the conflict in 
1990s. Subsequently, answers given by national experts and certain local leaders 
of Croatian and Serbian nationality are described in order to pre-test the bottom-
line of typology, i.e., the existence of conflict and non-conflict areas inhabited 
both by Croats and Serbs. In the end, two main conclusions are proposed. The 
one concerns the relevance of the basic dichotomy of the multiethnic areas, and 
the other the possible usefulness of the path dependence approach to the explana-
tion of the difference between conflict and peace areas in the case of Croatia.
Key words: multiethnic areas, conflicts, peace, typology, Croatia, path depend-
ence
1. Introduction
This paper is based on preliminary results of a research project on social in-
tegration and collective identities in certain multiethnic settings in Croatia.* 
General theoretical approaches and literature concerning the forms of peace 
and post-conflict processes in multiethnic settings, which constitute the 
* This paper is the result of the research project “Social Integration and Collective Iden-
tity in Multiethnic Areas of Croatia”, which has been carried out with the support of the 
Ministry of Science, Education and Sports of the Republic of Croatia.
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topic of this paper as well, were presented in a previous article by the au-
thor (Katunarić, 2007b). The central topic of the paper concerns two main 
peace modes in multiethnic settings, which are distinguished as regards 
conditions under which peace was established, either in the context of the 
war in Croatia or as a follow-up to the conclusion of the war in 1995.1 
The first mode is associated with areas that have preserved their integrities 
without major changes in their population composition, amid the spread of 
inter-ethnic violence in their surroundings. Curiously enough, only a few 
empirical studies (Varshney, 2002; Katunarić and Banovac, 2004) about this 
phenomenon exist in the available research literature bases, although one 
can assume that there are many more instances of such modes of peace 
preservation.2
Unlike the former, empirical studies on the second peace mode, i.e., 
the outcomes of post-conflict processes, are numerous and largely special-
ized as regards different phases of peace processes (see more details in: 
Katunarić, 2007b), which will be briefly described below.
Both modes of peace, i.e., peace in the midst of violent conflicts, and 
peace established upon the end of the conflicts, are displayed in the mul-
tiethnic settings of contemporary Croatia. The first mode emerged at the 
beginning of the 1990s in cities such as Pula (cf. Katunarić and Banovac, 
2004), or in towns and villages in the region of Gorski Kotar (see below) 
inhabited by both Croats and Serbs. These ethnically mixed communities 
succeeded in avoiding violence that was, otherwise, widespread in most 
areas where Croats and Serbs resided next to each other. The second mode 
of peace was established upon the conclusion of the conflict and it has 
subsequently passed through several phases.
In Section 2 below, results of a couple of empirical studies on the 
first mode of peace are summarized. Subsequently, in Section 3, a short 
overview is given of various types of peace generated in post-conflict proc-
esses. In Section 4, a typology of peace conditions in multiethnic settings 
in Croatia is proposed. In Section 5, some responses from the interviews 
with national interlocutors are presented. In Section 6, results of interviews 
with local ethnic leaders and some officials in two different multiethnic 
1 A short reminder on the war in Croatia is given in footnote 5.
2 On variations in relations between Jews and Palestinians in Israel, especially in urban 
areas, see: Yiftachel, 1992; Al-Haj, 2003. A rather similar case to conflict-and-peace vari-
ations in Croatia can be found in the study of Smith (2007), where the author describes a 
peaceful transition to federalism in a territory in Ethiopia, where the Siltie ethnic group 
makes up the majority, whereas, in other units, the transition largely caused ethnic dissent 
and violence.
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places are described. Additionally, in Section 7, some comparable findings 
from another survey are presented. Finally, differences between conflict 
and peace areas are summarized on the grounds of the preliminary empiri-
cal analysis, and an explanation based on the path dependence concept is 
outlined concerning what might have caused differences between the paths 
of conflict and peace in the multiethnic areas of Croatia.
2. Peace enclaves
Both common sense and research often perceive ethnic conflict as a total 
phenomenon, i.e., that it involves entire ethnic groups and, respectively, 
takes place everywhere where these groups reside next to each other (for 
criticism of viewing ethnic conflict as an all-encompassing collective action 
see: Brubaker, 2002). In a similar vein, as Varshney stated in his study on 
Hindu-Muslim conflicts in India, the main theoretical approaches to eth-
nic relations correctly explain the emergence of conflicts, but they fail to 
explain variations in conflict, including its absence in some places whose 
populations are composed of the same ethnicities (Varshney, 2002: 27).
How is possible, then, to explain the existence of the pockets of peace 
in the midst of the conflict climate? Varshney, for example, found that 
peace in some Indian cities is a result of the existence of the associational 
links of civil society, i.e., concord organizations, such as business clubs and 
trade unions, whose membership is composed of both Hindus and Mus-
lims. These links resisted a variety of “shock-waves” from the surround-
ings, spanning from the destruction of sacral objects to circulating gossip. 
At the end of his study, Varshney has attempted to explain, by analogy, the 
causes of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Thereby, he contends that the 
totalitarian Communist system brusquely prevented the formation of a civil 
sphere with autonomous organizations made up of members of different 
nationalities. Instead, the Party controlled what was supposed to be a civil 
society sphere. Hence, with demise of the Party, the interethnic ties were 
dissolved accordingly and, eventually, conflicts rendered unavoidable.
Unfortunately, this explanation also reiterates the shortcomings of the 
conventional approaches to ethnic conflict, for it overlooks the possibility 
of the existence of peace pockets in this case as well. The existence of what 
were named “peace enclaves/cradles” in the wars of the former Yugoslavia 
has been registered as well as explained in a case study by Katunarić and 
Banovac (2004). The authors have established that some multiethnic com-
munities, such as in Pula (Croatia), Tuzla (Bosnia-Herzegovina), and Ko-
sovska Kamenica (Kosovo) have managed to avoid ethnic violence in the 
1990s, and this happened primarily as a result of the autonomous actions of 
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local leaderships3 (a good part of which, notably, were former Communists) 
vis-à-vis the central/national political leaderships, which were prone to na-
tionalism and to the ethnic divide. The local leaders did everything pos-
sible to prevent conflicts. For example, they talked with representatives of 
different parties or nationalities, they outflanked spoilers of peace in their 
own rank-and-file, and they also agitated for peace and harmony among the 
local population directly, door-to-door, and indirectly, through local media. 
Thus, in the Yugoslav case, although no concord NGOs appeared, as in the 
Indian case, the actions of local political elites were decisive for the peace 
outcome. The authors maintain that this case illustrates the relevance of 
the constructionist approach to the varieties of ethnic relations (Cederman, 
2001; Joireman, 2003), i.e., that the outcome, whether peace or war, de-
pends mostly on deliberate choices on the part of the local actors, as there 
are no historically predetermined or uniform patterns of actions or events. 
In other words, local modes of ethnic relations are primarily the result of 
the will and actions of local actors, rather than the consequence of events 
or actions which stay outside of their control and responsibility.
3. The post-conflict processes
On the whole, peace conditions in Croatia have been established as a fol-
low-up to the conclusion of the conflicts in the second half of 1995. Re-
search literature on peace in multiethnic settings (e.g., Taras and Ganguly, 
2006; Richmond, 2004; Ganguly, 2004) generally differentiates between 
peace-keeping, peace-making, and peace-building conditions, and eventu-
ally democratic peace as a condition appropriate to mature democracies 
only (cf. Barkawi and Laffey, 1999). Yet, the tenet of democratic peace 
may be applied not only to international/interstate relations, but also to 
ethnic relations. The rationale for this is that in (mature) democracies (eth-
nic) conflicts, if they exist, are not escalated into violence, but are solved 
through democratic procedure and dialogue (Horrowitz, 2001). The holistic 
notion of peace culture (Mayor, 1997, 2004; Galtung, 2002) may also be 
added to the assortment of peace conditions, since it can be attributed to 
multiethnic areas, such as the peace enclaves, where maintaining peace in 
critical situations seems to be an element of local tradition (in the sense 
that is explained below, i.e., in the terms of path dependence).
3 A rather similar, although military, case is described by Arfi (2000: 569), namely peace 
(“live-and-let-live” logic) within war (“kill-or-be-killed” logic) during the First World War, 
where the former appeared as a result of the disobedience of some local commands of (the 
British) military troops toward the Central Command.
 Vjeran Katunarić: (Un)Avoidable War..., Revija za sociologiju 40 (2010), 1: 5–29
 9
In Croatia, with the withdrawal of the UN forces (UNPROFOR and 
UNTAES) from the region in 1997 (Rubinstein, 2005), a palette of condi-
tions for peace-building has existed along with elements of peace culture, 
i.e., places where no violent conflicts had occurred between local Croats 
and Serbs. Yet, a majority of the multiethnic settings inhabited by Croats 
and Serbs, especially as regards the current process of the return of refu-
gees (mainly Serbs) to their places of origin, can be situated on the scale 
of post-conflict processes.
Furthermore, although there are relatively numerous NGOs dealing with 
conflict resolution, peace and interculturalism (cf. Yilmaz, 2005; Falkhe-
imer and Heide, 2006) in Croatia, their impact on the ongoing process of 
re-integration still cannot match the magnitude of the impact of the concord 
organizations in India analysed by Varshney.4 The former typically gather 
just a few people of different nationalities (in the case of NGOs in culture 
see: Katunarić, 2007a: 112 et passim). The concord (Croat-Serb) organiza-
tions are, in fact, lacking in Croatia (except in a few places – see Section 
6.2.). Instead, Serbs and Croats typically meet on an everyday basis, which 
is not sufficient for consolidating their relations; or, they establish political 
party coalitions in particular local governmental units, which are, indeed, 
an associational link, but are obviously not enough also to consolidate the 
peace condition.
For a democratic peace to be established – i.e., the condition under 
which violence is not used in interethnic disputes (Horrowitz, 2001: 560–
565), and where the ethnic parties do not display secessionist tendencies, 
or these cannot for some reasons be realized (Guelke, 2004; James, 2003) 
– in Croatia and other, previously war-torn areas of the former Yugoslavia, 
some macro-structural changes are needed as well, such as consolidation of 
democratic governance, further economic growth, and education informed 
by interculturalism (cf. Žagar, 2002: 61).
Last, but not least, some lessons may also be learned from the cases 
of the Croatian peace enclaves, such as certain places in the regions of 
Gorski Kotar, Western Slavonia (e.g. Moslavina), and Istria. The current 
situation as well as traditional practices of cross-boundary interactions in 
these areas may correspond to the peace culture concept as well, primarily 
because the natives have abstained from keeping or using arms in critical 
situations (for a list of the peace culture elements see: De Rivera, 2004, 
2005). In any case, the predilections for a culture of peace may be taken 
4 For similar attempts at establishing cross-ethnic associational links, yet on a temporary 
basis, such as summer camps, see: Nelson, Carver and Kaboolian, 2007.
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as complementary to democratic culture, for the latter, although “realistic”, 
i.e., confined to the circle of mature democracies, also recommends non-
violence in settling disputes between groups.
4. Typology and research methods
4.1. Typology
Multiethnic areas in Croatia (inhabited mostly by Croats and Serbs) can 
be differentiated with regard to their past experiences, i.e., the first half of 
1990s, which can also be associated with local memories of what happened 
in the communities during the period of the Second World War (when Serbs 
were the main target of pogroms and genocide executed by the government 
of the Independent State of Croatia, a pro-Nazi state proclaimed in 1941):
a) Areas where there was no violence in the 1990s or the 1940s, i.e. 
during the Second World War – for which the culture of peace might be 
a proper term.
b) Areas that avoided violence in the 1990s, but not in the 1940s. 
Thus, the legacy of peace in this case may be attributed to the impact of 
the Communist Party policy “Brotherhood and Unity” in Croatia/Yugosla-
via, for the peace established from 1945 to 1990 under the auspices of the 
Communist regime has somehow been prolonged into the 1990s as well.
c) Areas in which there was no ethnic violence in the 1940s, but it 
emerged in the 1990s, which may be called the new conflict areas.
d) Finally, areas in which conflicts and violence appeared in both pe-
riods of time – traditionally or chronically conflict areas.
Areas can also – at least logically – be differentiated according to their 
experiences with the current process of return and re-integration of refu-
gees, which is associated with what locals have experienced in the 1990s. 
For example:
• Areas in which the process of re-integration runs smoothly, and where 
there was no violence in the 1990s (but, still some portion of emigration), 
which is probably highly congruent with type a).
• Areas in which the process of re-integration runs smoothly, but locals 
have experienced violence in the 1990s.
• Areas in which the process of re-integration is being made difficult 
or obstructed, and where there was violence during the 1990s, with many 
refugees as a consequence.
A part of the typology is presented in Table 1, where particular places 
in Croatia are selected in order to illustrate the above types (some examples 
are given according to suggestions of national interlocutors as well – see 
section 5.1.).
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Table 1. Types of situations in the 1990s and nowadays, with some 
tentative examples
Violent 1990s Peaceful 1990s
Disintegration of communities in 
the 1990s
Cohesion of communities in the 
1990s
e.g. Vukovar, and
most of Eastern 
Slavonia
?
e.g. Plevlja, and 









e.g. some places 
in Gorski Kotar 
and Istria?
?
In general, the typology is aimed at emphasizing the advantage of the 
case-approach over the population-oriented approach (cf. Elbadawi and 
Sambanis, 2002), for the sake of explaining variations in ethnic conflict, 
including the occurrence of peace in war, which cannot be grasped if the 
whole population of a nationality is taken as a collective actor in war and 
peace, respectively.
4.2. Methods
Two methods are applied respectively in the research. One is oral history 
obtained through narrative interviews with certain national experts and lo-
cal leaders, and some officials as well, which is applied in the first phase of 
research. The aim of this method application is to reconstruct the periods of 
time that are critical for understanding events and developments in different 
multiethnic settings, certain multiperspective accounts of the interlocutors 
notwithstanding. Other methods, including the analysis of various sources, 
such as newspapers or military and political documents of the time, may 
be helpful here, of course, but they could not be applied without expand-
ing the scope of research deeper into the historical analysis of the war in 
the early 1990s. Instead, one may recommend some detailed descriptions 
on that period of time, for example in the historical studies carried out by 
Žunec (2007) and by Ingrao and Emmert (2009) – some chapters of which 
may serve for readers to check comparatively with the historical narrative 
given in the interviews.
The other method, which will be applied in the next phase of research 
(and will be reported in a set of analytical papers which are currently being 
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prepared by the members of research team), is a survey of larger samples of 
local populations in different multiethnic settings. The aim of the applica-
tion of this method is to complement the oral history analysis with insights 
into the local people’s opinions and attitudes on a number of issues, includ-
ing the views of the Other.
5. Information and views of the national interlocutors
The persons that have been chosen as national interviewees are public 
figures. Next to their expertise in various aspects of Croat-Serb relations 
(e.g. history of the relations, contemporary politics, legislation on minori-
ties, peace initiatives in the beginning of the 1990s, documenting the war 
crimes), another criteria for their selection was balancing their national 
origins, i.e., Croatian and Serbian, respectively. They are also members 
of various governmental bodies or NGOs, both national and international. 
Their specific role in the research procedure was to give an overview of 
current situations in a variety of multiethnic settings in Croatia, with back-
grounds in the 1990s and, when possible, earlier history, especially that of 
the Second World War period. In this way, they have facilitated the quest 
for comparable types of multiethnic places, and, accordingly, for modes of 
peace. In addition, the interviewees were asked to express their own views 
of the broader context of the wars and post-war situations in Croatia and 
the former Yugoslavia as a whole.
In sum, six national interlocutors were selected for the interviews: 
an expert on Croatian- Serbian history; a highly positioned advisor of 
the President of Croatia; the former head of a major NGO for human 
rights and scholar; a political leader of the Croatian Serbs, also a scholar; 
another political leader of the Croatian Serbs (belonging to an opposite 
political camp in the Serbian community, which strongly criticizes the 
major political party of the Croatian Serbs as being too collaborative with 
the Croatian government), who also runs a broad network of Serbian or-
ganizations in Croatia; and, finally, a former Croatian Minister of the 
Interior in the early 1990s, who played a key role in successful peace-
talks with local Serbs in an ethnically mixed area in the Gorski Kotar 
region.
5.1.  Distinguishing between the peace areas (PAs) and the 
conflict areas (CAs)
Virtually all the interlocutors differentiated between the PAs and CAs in 
Croatia, both for the period of 1990s and nowadays, when processes of 
return/re-integration of refugees are taking place. The following places in 
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the region of Gorski Kotar (in the central part of Croatia) are delineated 
as typical PAs, which have preserved peace amid interethnic violence in a 
number of other places in Croatia:5 Moravice (formerly, Srpske /Serbian/ 
Moravice), Drežnica, Vrbovsko, Plevlja, and Gomirje. These places also 
have not experienced major obstacles in the process of return of the locals 
who abandoned their homes during the 1990s.
Notably, even though the Yugoslav Army provided Serbs in this area 
with arms, aiming to instigate their uprising against the newly-elected 
Croatian government led by the right-wing Croatian Democratic Union, 
yet including some moderate politicians as well, who also encouraged 
peace as a solution, the local Serbs decided to conclude peace with the 
Croatian government. How can this outcome be explained? An interlocu-
tor, who is scholar and formerly the president of a major NGO in Croatia, 
generally outlined three circumstances that have determined the occur-
rence of both peace and violence. As he stressed, the first circumstance 
was “historicism” in the viewing of the past (a bulk of the people on 
both sides have adopted such basically nationalistic accounts of the his-
tory, but obviously less so in the PAs, as will also be exemplified below); 
secondly, the type of local politicians (among whom nationalists were 
favoured, and moderates removed from the scene in the CAs, unlike in 
the PAs); and thirdly, contingencies, i.e., the fortunes of war, where, for 
instance, some places were spared simply because the Yugoslav Army 
units in their campaigns of destruction, sometimes used to bivouac and 
rest in particular places, thus sparing such areas, including some PAs, 
from casualties and devastation. Nevertheless, he was not specific in 
this regard, and did not deny that the existence of some PAs, at least, 
was due to the autonomous attitudes and actions of local leaders and 
populations.
The former Minister of the Interior maintains that the PAs are prima-
rily a result of collaboration between moderates in the Croatian govern-
ment and moderates among local Serbs. He also notes that most people 
on both sides, i.e., Croatian and Serbian, did not want the war to hap-
5 A reminder: the war in Croatia begun in March 1991 by an attack of the Serb para-
military troops on a Croatian police squad in Plitvice. The war lasted until January 1992, 
and was followed by the cease-fire and the subsequent deployment of the UN troops. 
The war resumed for a short while in August 1995, when the Croatian Army invaded the 
areas of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK), and re-established Croatian 
state sovereignty over the latter. As a consequence of this, nearly a couple of hundred 
thousand Serbs left Croatia. The bulk of the returnees nowadays stem from this contingent 
of refugees or, on the other hand, from the contingents of refugees from the RSK in the 
early 1990s.
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pen.6 Likewise, he added, most of the Yugoslav Army leadership did not 
want the war either. On the one hand, he blames the Croatian extrem-
ists in the government as instigators of the war; these extremists having 
arrived from abroad, i.e., from Croatian political émigrés circles mostly 
in Canada, the USA and Australia. Allegedly, the latter put the Croatian 
president Tuđman under their control. On the other hand, he also blames 
the Serbian president Milošević, and his coalition with Serbian extremists, 
respectively.7
Another interlocutor provided his own typological description, recall-
ing old-fashioned anthropogeographic accounts, by describing Serbs from 
the PAs as “peace-loving” and “moderate ”, unlike those from Dalmatia 
(the southern region of Croatia), who are allegedly more forceful and con-
flict-prone. However, in the view of the third interlocutor, such an account 
is nonsensical; most events were generated through the actions of local 
leaders and populations, which actions were contingent, depending on par-
ticular circumstances. In some CAs, for instance, such as Knin (in northern 
Dalmatia), or Osijek (in Eastern Slavonia) – this having been stressed by 
all the interviewees – some peace-prone leaders on both the Croatian (e.g. 
Josip Reihl-Kir, the chief of police in Osijek) and the Serbian sides (e.g. 
Dmitar Obradović, a peace activist from Vrginmost in the Banija region), 
who both acted with some success on the eve of the war, were finally killed 
by extremist compatriots.
6 This perception corresponds to the results of a survey in Croatia from the end of 1980s, 
according to which an overwhelming majority of Croats and Serbs did not express eth-
nic intolerance (Katunarić, 1992). Nevertheless, the conflict was generated by smaller 
groups of extreme politicians and by local or imported militants, who incited a broader 
arousal, permeated by heightened intolerance and hatred among respective populations. 
The usual moves by the former in this direction included killings of several people on 
each side. This is typical, for example, for what happened in Osijek and its surround-
ing at the beginning of the 1990s, as told by an interlocutor, who was a local politi-
cal leader at that time, in an interview made for the study by Katunarić and Banovac 
(2004).
7 To the same interlocutor, the Croatian extremists pushed Tuđman to make a deal with 
Milošević in terms of dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina into a Croatian and a Serbian part, 
with the addition of a Muslim enclave. Consequently, Milošević was prepared to give up 
his support for the Serbs in Croatia, and Tuđman, in return, for Croats in Posavina [the 
Sava River Basin], a north-western part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And indeed, until the 
middle of 1990s, Posavina was virtually emptied of Croats, without any sign of objection 
from Tuđman, and in parallel, most Serbs left their homes in Croatia without Milošević’s 
showing any serious disagreement with such events. This population engineering was eu-
phemistically named “humane resettlement” (humano preseljenje) by the Croatian govern-
ment of the time.
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The interlocutors have also delineated the city of Vukovar, and the area 
of Eastern Slavonia on the whole, as a typical CA in the 1990s, but as a 
PA nowadays, for the return of refugees is unfolding relatively smoothly. 
Difficulties with the current process of return occur mostly in the hinterland 
of the city of Zadar (which encompasses a good part of the Ravni Kotari 
area), which is a typical CA, as it used to be in the early 1990s. In Vu-
kovar, and a good part of Eastern Slavonia, most of the Serbs have opted 
to stay after the withdrawal from the area of the insurgent Serb leadership 
and the Yugoslav Army troops, waiting for the resumption of Croatian rule 
and the return of local Croats to their homes. Currently, these two ethnic 
communities live in peace, but deeply separated, both in the private (e.g. 
housing) and the public sphere (e.g. schooling) (cf. Čorkalo Biruški and 
Ajduković, 2009).
An interesting historical aspect of the PAs and the CAs has been out-
lined in the interviews with two national interlocutors. It is that during the 
Second World War a majority of the Serbian population (living in the rural 
areas) accepted the setting up of the Independent State of Croatia, even 
though the latter was a pro-Nazi, genocidal state. At the same time, the Ser-
bian elite, mostly residing in major Croatian cities, fled from Croatia. (This 
is why the Ustashi, the notorious Croatian elite army forces, paradoxically, 
were so “efficient” in their atrocities against Serbs.) In the 1990s, however, 
the situation was just the opposite as regards the reactions to the political 
changes on the part of various parts of the Serbian population. This time, 
it was the Serbian elite who largely decided to stay in Croatia, while most 
of the rest of the population, i.e., in Krajina, fled from Croatia, but mostly 
in 1995, during the Croatian military operation “Storm” (Oluja). Among 
the Serb elite, some individuals surfaced who played the roles of media-
tors in the PAs. Yet, they could not reach the CAs with their activities, 
mostly because nationalists, including paramilitaries from Serbia and the 
Yugoslav Army, respectively, took control of the local populations in such 
areas and thus succeeded in pushing them into the armed struggle against 
the Croatian government.
The interlocutors, who were peace mediators at that time as well, 
stressed the negative role of the Croatian media, which virtually ignored 
their efforts and actions in establishing the areas of peace.
Finally, the national interviewees could not confirm the existence of 
such cases that would illustrate the existence of the typology categories 
that are question-marked in Table 1. Hence, the multiethnic places which 
were peaceful in 1990s, but have experienced disintegration or are having 
difficulties with re-integration nowadays, are only formal or logical rather 
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than empirical categories.8 (See Map 1 showing some CA and PA places 
analysed or just mentioned in the paper.)
Map 1. Croatia with some CA and PA places
5.2. Implementation of the policy of re-integration
In a recent study on the process of return and re-integration in Croatia, 
Mesić and Bagić stated that only a “sustained return” of refugees is proving 
possible (Mesić and Bagić, 2007). This means, primarily, that it is actually 
impossible to reproduce the demographic structure predating the war through 
8 In addition, the national respondents could not provide any evidence that could confirm 
or refute the existence of the 4.1.b) to 4.1.d) types, i.e., the historical Second World War 
contingencies of particular places. Nevertheless, this issue is reiterated, with some out-
come, in the interviews with local leaders (see Section 6).
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the return of refugees and displaced persons. The number of returnees is 
relatively small, and elderly folk make up the bulk of the population (one 
of the interlocutors called this phenomenon the “elephants’ graveyard”).
The national interlocutors have confirmed such “demographic realism” 
in approaching the issue of return/re-integration. At the same time, they 
warn about the existence of a double bind in the governmental policy. On 
the one hand, at the beginning of the return/re-integration processes, both 
Croats and Serbs resisted them. Later on, however, the central government 
adopted an active policy of return of the refugees, whereas, at the same 
time, some parts of the local (Croatian) governmental units obstructed the 
policy. On the other hand, as explained by the interlocutor speaking on be-
half of the majority of Serbs in Croatia, any policy of decentralization and 
local autonomy in this regard would not be beneficial to the Serbs, as long 
as the policy’s aim would be to provide for the extension of a “weak” or 
“minimal state”. By the same token, only a welfarist informed government 
can be helpful to the Serbs, for they desperately need better social services, 
schooling, job opportunities and, generally, a socio-economic safety net, 
and not just a free-market game, which puts those people at the mercy of 
highly biased private (mainly Croatian) employers.
Yet, the crucial problem with the Serbian minority, as pointed out by 
the Serbian NGO activist in the interview, is that the Croatian govern-
ment has enacted a nearly perfect Constitutional Law on the Protection 
of the Rights of Minorities in the year 2002, but its implementation has 
failed thus far (this aspect is properly documented in: Srpski demokratski 
forum, 2007). The implementation entails, among other things, the setting 
up of two different languages and scripts in the ethnically mixed areas, 
then restitution of rights to the Serbian tenants who have emigrated from 
the area, and the employment of Serbs in the public sector, which would 
be set up in proportion to the minority’s shares in local populations.9 Un-
fortunately, says the interlocutor, the practice of the Croatian government 
(not just a part of it, he argues, but on the whole!) is just the opposite, as 
it wants to keep the presence of Serbs in Croatia at a minimum, i.e., to 
retain the ethnic cleansing results from the 1990s, when the share of Serbs 
in the general population has declined from 12% in 1991 to merely 4%. 
On the other hand, he adds, the official image of the Croatian minority 
policy, especially the one manufactured for the eyes of the European Un-
9 As Mesić and Bagić noted in their study on returnees, about a third of returnee Serbs 
were unemployed, compared to a countrywide average of 17% for Croatia. Likewise, only 
8% were employed or self-employed, while 11% were dependent on humanitarian assist-
ance (Mesić and Bagić, 2007).
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ion representatives,10 is polished and basically false, although the current 
government has co-opted some Serbian politicians who, as the interlocu-
tor maintains, serve as a charade for two-faced politics. Such remarks, as 
well as remarks made by other national interlocutors, have been double-
checked in the interviews with some local leaders in the PAs.
6.  Interviews with local leaders in Plaški (a CA) and Vrbovsko 
(a PA)
6.1. Plaški
Plaški is a town in Lika, traditionally inhabited largely by Serbs (nearly 90%, 
and 10% of Croats, out of the total of 4,659 inhabitants in 1991). Between 
1991 and 1995 it belonged to the territory of Krajina (the self-proclaimed 
Serbian state in Croatia). Afterwards, during the Croatian military operation 
“Storm” (Oluja) in August 1995, the town was virtually emptied: only 92 
persons remained. Shortly afterwards, a number of Croats from an area in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (mostly from the surroundings of Banja Luka) poured 
into the town and occupied a good part of the Serbs’ houses or apartments. 
In 2001, after the assumption of municipal power by the Serbian Autono-
mous Democratic Party (SDSS) in the regular elections, the houses and 
apartments were returned or restituted to the local Serbs. However, only 
some 25% of the Serbs have returned to Plaški. The nearby village of Lička 
Jasenica (which belongs to the Plaški municipality) was exclusively a Ser-
bian community with some 500 inhabitants (unlike the village of Saborsko 
in the vicinity, for example, which is a Croatian community exclusively). 
Following August 1995, Lička Jasenica was emptied, and nowadays only 
elderly people (some one hundred of them) have returned.
In Plaški, the interviewees were the former mayor (from 2001 to 2005), 
who is a Serb, and a teacher in the elementary school, who is a Croat who 
came there from Bosnia-Herzegovina in the wave following the “Storm” 
operation. The interlocutor in Lička Jasenica is a medical doctor (thus, an 
exemption among interlocutors qua officials), a Croat.
Interlocutors in Plaški stressed that the situation with the return of 
refugees is replete with problems: even though the legal matters with the 
restitution of the Serb ownerships are mainly solved, the age of the most 
of the returnees in addition to the poor economic situation (no investments 
and, practically, no new employment) discourages the further process of 
10 Croatia is an EU candidate and is currently in talks with the EU, which pressures the 
government to solve, among others, the problem of return and resettlement of the Serbian 
refugees.
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return. A remarkable difference in the interpretation of that period of time, 
i.e., after 2005, following the resumption of local power by a coalition of 
the Croatian political parties, exists between the Serbian and the Croatian 
interlocutors in Plaški. According to the former, the new authorities have 
unduly removed the Serbs employed in the local administration, while the 
latter maintains that the preceding authority, constituted by the Serb political 
party, appointed only Serbs to the administrative posts, and that the moves 
of the new local leadership could be justified accordingly. The former in-
terlocutor, unlike the latter, also emphasizes that the implementation of the 
Constitutional Law on the Protection of Minorities has hardly been initiated 
as regards Serbs; for instance, the introduction of teaching for the Serbian 
pupils in their Serbian mother tongue met strong resistance from the local 
school authorities. Another difference in the views of the interlocutors ap-
pears with regard to the possible effects of the expected economic growth 
of the town. The Serbian interlocutor maintains that economic growth alone 
cannot have positive effects on the interethnic relations, while the Croatian 
interlocutor thinks, to the contrary, that an economic take-off would be of 
key importance for the cohesion of the community. At the same time, both 
interlocutors agree in that there have been no major interethnic incidents in 
recent years (unlike in the second half of the 1990s). Moreover, they say, 
there is no visible segregation along ethnic lines: Croats and Serbs display 
a certain tolerance towards each other, and certain provocations made by 
local (Croatian) militants do not seem to have spoilt the relationships – 
although there are no concord (interethnic) associations (except the local 
soccer team which consists of Croats and Serbs). Likewise, the interlocu-
tors point out that local intermarriages are highly tolerated by both sides. 
Finally, they do not see that institutional or political reform in terms of 
(de)centralization would bring an improvement to both sides, arguing that 
important posts on both levels, i.e., local and national, are occupied by in-
competent officials and politicians, who do not care much for the policy of 
re-integration and reconciliation, or deliberately obstruct any such trends.
The interlocutor in Lička Jasenica has given a fairly different picture 
of the local conditions. The local economy and infrastructure, as he states, 
seems to have deteriorated: there is no school in the village, and the local 
post office is rundown; even the water supply has barely been secured.11 
11 Cutting off the water supply was frequently used from 1991 to 1995 by the authorities in 
the Serb Krajina vis-à-vis some Croatian villages and cities (e.g. Zadar). Afterwards, with 
resumption of the control of the territory by the Croatian government, it used to happen 
that the authorities in turn, revengefully cut off the water supply or electricity to the set-
tlements inhabited mainly or exclusively by Serbs.
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The main cause of the problem, according to him, is the political centre in 
Croatia, which had abandoned local development and has hence practically 
discouraged the return of the Serbs. He basically sees segregation as the 
main cause of the conflicts, blaming the lack of communication between 
the different ethnic communities, whereas a multiethnic milieu, he argues, 
produces peace and tolerance. He also believes that economic growth is 
the key, and that decentralization would be a better solution for the policy 
of re-integration, because local people are genuinely more interested in im-
proving the actual existing situation, unlike officials and politicians in the 
centre. Due to the local segregation (Lička Jasenica inhabited by Serbs 
only, and Saborsko, which is seven kilometres away from Jasenica, inhab-
ited by Croats only), there are no incidents on the ethnic basis, but there 
is no communication between the two communities either (the only café is 
located in Saborsko, but the Serbs from Jasenica have not visited it at all). 
Finally, the interlocutor maintains that Croatian EU membership may some-
what improve the local interethnic relations in the long rather than the short 
run, nevertheless, but only provided that Croatian EU membership would 
open up local windows of economic opportunities, especially for tourism.
6.2. Vrbovsko
Vrbovsko is a town and municipality in the Karlovac County (in the terms 
of traditional geographical regions in Croatia, it is located on the verge of 
the Lika region, but locals consider themselves to be part of the Gorski 
Kotar region) and has 60 settlements and 6 100 inhabitants. The town popu-
lation consists mostly of Croats (55.8% in 1991, and 57.2% in 2001) and 
Serbs (34% in 1991, and 36.2% in 2001). Thus, unlike Plaški, there was no 
change in the demographic composition there in the critical period of time: 
both populations have even increased slightly. This is due, as explained 
above, to the decision by local leaders and population in 1991, particularly 
Serbs, to live in peace with the newly elected Croatian government. Just a 
few of the local Serbs, obviously militants who eventually realized that they 
did not have any broader support among their compatriots, left the area.
Interlocutors in Vrbovsko were: the former mayor, who is Serbian (he 
left the office recently, at the beginning of 2008), and a recently retired 
engineer of forestry, who is a Croat and a prominent figure both in the lo-
cal community and in the whole region of Gorski Kotar.
Both of them emphasize the peacefulness of this place and the whole 
area as a part of a long tradition. In the Second World War, for example, 
the area was generally spared the conflicts and atrocities, which were rather 
typical for most areas in Croatia inhabited by Serbs. It did happen at that 
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time that a Serbian village in the vicinity was scorched by the Ustashi, and 
that the Croats provided their Serbian neighbours with shelter, mostly by 
receiving them into their own homes. In this way, as explained by one of 
the interlocutors, a solid bond of trust was forged between the two com-
munities.
In 1991, although initially local Croats and Serbs were armed – the 
former by the ruling party, i.e., the HDZ, and the latter by the Yugoslav 
Army – both sides decided not to use those weapons. The interlocutors 
readily say that they are extremely different from the Krajina Serbs. Here, 
concord, i.e., ethnically mixed, organizations exist, like the soccer club or 
the association of hunters. Likewise, intermarriages are very frequent and 
such links are very solid. Only recently, warn the interlocutors, some pres-
sures have come from outside, aimed at separating the two communities. 
One such pressure is the introduction of confessional religious instruc-
tion into the school by the Croatian government, which separates Catholic 
(Croatian) and Christian Orthodox (Serbian) children. The other pressure 
comes from the Serbian political parties, whose representatives – also not 
from Vrbovsko – remark that “the local Serbs are not good Serbs”, that 
they are abandoning their national specificity and identity. In addition, lo-
cal Serbs do not like the policy which, as a result, introduced Serbian 
language in the schools, because it separates local Serbian children from 
their Croatian peers. In the words of one of the interlocutors, “we do not, 
nor do we want to, live next to each other (suživot), for we live together 
(zajedno)”.
Furthermore, the interlocutors do not believe that either centralization 
or further decentralization would bring an improvement to the local com-
munity. Similarly, they think that the EU-membership of Croatia might not 
necessarily be important for the well-being of the area. Nevertheless, they 
stress that further economic development should be an absolute priority, 
and that EU-funds should be used to this purpose, e.g., in sustaining the 
local cattle breeding and tourism.
7. Germane data from another survey
In Tables 2 and 3, data are presented from a survey in 2004 in the Croatian 
regions of Gorski Kotar, Lika and Istria (Banovac and Boneta, 2006),12 in-
dicating attitudes toward Others by respondents, mostly Croats, living in a 
CA place (Gospić, the Lika region), and a PA place (Vrbovsko, the Gorski 
Kotar region).
12 I thank the authors for passing on to me the unpublished data bases of their research.
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Table 2. Is a common life of Croats and Serbs still possible?
Gospić Vrbovsko Total
“No” 8 1 9
Column Percent 10.53%  2.22%
“Yes, but not as much as before” 43 11 54
Column Percent 56.58% 24.44%
“Yes, absolutely” 25 33 58
Column Percent 32.89% 73.33%
Totals 76 45 121
Table 3. If you would be in a position to decide on relations with the 







































































Gospić 28.75 25.00 38.75 18.75 11.25   8.75 60.00  8.75
Vrbovsko 57.78 60.00 66.67 55.56 37.78  31.11 86.67  6.67
Bosniacs
Gospić 50.00 48.75 57.50 35.00 12.50  26.25 67.50  2.50
Vrbovsko 73.33 77.78 80.00 68.89 44.44  46.67 84.44  0.00
Montenegrins
Gospić 32.50 23.75 40.00 20.00 11.25  12.50 61.25  8.75
Vrbovsko 66.67 68.89 75.56 64.44 42.22  44.44 86.67  2.22
Croats
Gospić 98.75 96.25 96.25 96.25 97.50  96.25 82.50  1.25
Vrbovsko 95.56 95.56 95.56 93.33 93.33 100.00 95.56  0.00
Roma
Gospić 32.50 22.50 40.00 16.25 10.00  10.00 61.25  5.00
Vrbovsko 57.78 55.56 68.89 55.56 37.78  26.67 86.67  6.67
Slovenians
Gospić 42.50 31.25 50.00 25.00 12.50  20.00 70.00 10.00
Vrbovsko 71.11 75.56 75.56 75.56 60.00  48.89 86.67  0.00
Serbs
Gospić 58.75 50.00 61.25 41.25 15.00  35.00 65.00  8.75
Vrbovsko 75.56 77.78 82.22 77.78 55.56  48.89 86.67  4.44
Italians
Gospić 48.75 41.25 63.75 27.50 16.25  28.75 83.75  2.50
Vrbovsko 75.56 82.22 86.67 77.78 53.33  46.67 95.56  0.00
* Only answers “Yes”, and percentages, are given.
Obviously, respondents in Vrbovsko (a PA) have more faith in a com-
mon life shared by Croats and Serbs than respondents in Gospić (a CA) 
– with regard to the experiences in the 1990s. Likewise, the social distance 
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of the former is significantly lower than that of the latter. This is virtually 
true for all groups on the list, including Serbs. The only exceptions are the 
Croats (actually, this is an expression of a high self-preference among the 
respondents qua Croats).
On the other hand, differences in social distance, as shown in Table 
3, reflect the opinion expressed by some interlocutors in the interviews, 
which is that people in the PAs are, at least partly, different from people 
in the CAs in terms of their “mentality”. Nevertheless, such an attitude 
– regardless as to whether it indicates real differences in the respective 
cultural patterns or merely reflects some of the interlocutors’ prejudices – 
may obscure the fact that differences between the two areas are relative 
rather than absolute. In other words, one should not ignore the existence 
of a certain number of respondents in the CAs, whose attitudes are similar 
or even identical to attitudes of the majority of the respondents, and other 
people, in the PAs. Hence, different circumstances or contingencies might 
have been responsible for providing different “mentalities”. Thus, in some 
places, peace-prone actors with accordingly low social distance have pre-
vailed at a critical juncture over conflict-prone actors with high social dis-
tance – and vice versa. Of course, the existence of a long tradition of peace 
in a PA may indeed contribute to the peace outcome in such precarious 
situations. However, the tradition alone cannot be a sufficient condition for 
peace. Some other contingencies, such as the above-mentioned fortuitous 
paths of the war operations, might be equally important in sustaining the 
peace outcome. Naturally enough, the outlooks for peace in a crisis envi-
ronment will be greater in places where local conditions resemble peace 
culture – and vice versa, they will be smaller there where local conditions, 
such as a culture of violence, are conducive to mass mobilization on a 
(mono)ethnic basis.
It should be pointed out that both survey data and the data from the 
interviews have been obtained recently, i.e., more than ten years after the 
completion of the war in Croatia. As such, they cannot make for an evi-
dence of “cultural” differences between CAs and PAs, i.e., in terms of the 
culture of violence and culture of peace, respectively. Undoubtedly, social 
distance in CAs, for example, might have been substantially lower in pre-
conflict periods than later (cf. Katunarić, 2009). Consequently, the war by 
itself caused enlargement of social distance between Croats and Serbs. On 
the other hand, the existence of PAs and their predispositions to peace 
rather than conflict and violence, i.e., their “culture of peace”, should not 
indeed be seen in terms of primordialism, whether founded emotionally or 
in a distant, yet mythologized, past, but in the terms of their experience 
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with some previous episodes of crisis in the relations between Croats and 
Serbs, and their consequent peaceful solutions. Such an experience preced-
ing the one in the 1990s, and indeed most importantly, happened during 
World War II. In this respect, a path dependence explanation may be the 
most suitable.
8. A path dependence explanation
These reliabilities as well as differences between a CA (Plaški) and a PA 
(Vrbovsko) described in Section 6, may be taken to illustrate the path 
dependence or, more precisely, the self-reinforcing sequences in histori-
cal processes that are conceptualised by some historical sociologists as 
a proper substitute for causal analysis, given that there existed, presum-
ably, three different initial options in this case for both the Serbs and 
the Croats. The first possible option was to establish, or to contribute 
to, peace. The second option was to fight, and the third to flee, i.e., to 
leave the area. What the actors have chosen – that, as a consequence, has 
determined their future. Thus, group members were “locked in” (Arfi, 
2000: 566) to the process they or the most powerful among them traced. 
In general, “once contingent historical events take place [e.g. the initial 
peace arrangement in some parts of Gorski Kotar and Lika, or riots by 
Serbs in Zadar’s hinterland], path-dependent sequences are marked by 
relatively deterministic causal patterns or… ‘inertia’ [which]… involves 
mechanisms that reproduce a particular institutional pattern over time” 
(Mahoney, 2000: 511; see also: Pierson, 2000; Aminzade, 1992). In this 
case, that means that Gorski Kotar and Zadar’s hinterland are by no 
means “pre-paid” for peace and war, respectively, for the contingency of 
the initial events rules out inevitability, i.e., an entirely deterministic or 
probabilistic explanation. Nevertheless, “[t]o argue that an event is con-
tingent is not the same thing as arguing that the event is truly random and 
without antecedent causes” (Mahoney, 2000: 513). Thus, peace in some 
multiethnic areas of Croatia in the 1990s, as well as peaceful reintegra-
tion nowadays, is not purely coincidental, and peace and tolerance can 
be taken as a possibility, both historically and as regards the current or 
the future outlook.
The path dependence is also a recurrent topic in ethnic conflict re-
search, yet more frequently so as to contribute to the explanation of the 
occurrence of ethnic conflict (cf. Ruane and Todd, 2004; Arfi, 2000; Smith, 
2007; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002) rather than peace (for the case of the 
Northern Ireland settlement of peace see: Ruane and Todd, 2007). In the lat-
ter, peace is explained as the product of “critical junctures”, i.e., situations 
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in which the actors for some reasons – most often these are international 
pressures combined with domestic forces committed to the pragmatism of 
peace – decided to cease with the precedent practices of violence. This 
mode of peace, however, as pointed out in the Introduction to this paper, 
does not have the same root as the one perpetuated in traditionally peaceful 
multiethnic areas. Consequently, the peace is path-dependent as much as 
the violent conflict is. Nevertheless, as much as violent conflict can, under 
certain conditions, be converted into peace, peace can also be altered into 
violent conflict, although it cannot be substantiated that the conflict occurs 
at the outset of the creation of multiethnic settings, i.e., that “war is the 
father of all” (Heraclites).
9. Conclusions
Two main conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the preliminary phase 
of research into certain multiethnic areas in Croatia. The first conclusion 
concerns the typology, for some differences between the areas of ethnic 
violence and ethnic peace can be discerned. The most significant differ-
ence concerns the history of a particular place. The CA places studied here 
used to be conflicting in the past as well. In such a way, they might have 
transmitted the messages of mutual ethnic distrust through generations. On 
the other hand, PA places “remember” good conduct in the past, and are 
consequently, during crisis situations, committed to peace rather than con-
flict as an option. In addition, members of different nationalities in the 
PA places constitute the common/concord organizations, unlike in the CA 
places, where interethnic communication either does not exist or it unfolds 
on a day-to-day basis, i.e. superficially. This finding basically confirms 
Varshney’s argument on the focal importance of the associational links be-
tween members of different ethnic groups.
With regard to the typology (outlined in 4.1.), only types a), and e), 
respectively, i.e., culture of peace (in the case of the PA), and types d), 
and g), respectively, i.e., traditionally conflict areas, have been detected 
so far.
The second conclusion concerns the explanation of differences between 
the CA and the PA areas. On the basis of the conjectures surfacing in the 
oral history, where commonly shared views of the interviewees are taken 
as a basis to reconstruct the (historical) process that bifurcated the fates of 
the areas – it can be demonstrated that the choice for peace or war was 
the result of an interplay between local tradition (of peace and conflict, 
respectively), on the one hand, and the macro-political context created by 
the Croatian government, Serbian government and the Yugoslav Army, on 
Vjeran Katunarić: (Un)Avoidable War..., Revija za sociologiju 40 (2010), 1: 5–29
26
the other. It is questionable, however, how much events in the 1990s could 
have been determined by local tradition or micro-politics of the local lead-
ers only. Still, it can be argued that local leaderships, whether Serbian or 
Croatian, who refused to collaborate with their respective national(istic) 
leaders, have insomuch heightened their chances for the perpetuation of 
the local peace. Thus, peace was not the main option of national policies 
at that time, but merely local and – rarely successful.
Because of such contingencies, a “path dependence” approach can pre-
sumably be employed in this case. A rationale for its application can be 
found in the fact that, in a few areas in Croatia, a long-lasting tradition of 
peace may have generated peace as a consequence, whereas conflicts have 
generated further conflicts (in many more areas inhabited by Croats and 
Serbs) in subsequent critical situations. Whether this is true in other PA or 
CA cases as well, or some variations exist in this regard, and why such 
variations occur, is an issue that may direct future research, resulting with 
a more complex typology of CAs and PAs in Croatia.
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Ovaj je članak zasnovan na prvim rezultatima istraživačkog projekta o druš-
tvenoj integraciji i kolektivnim identitetima u nekim multietničkim sredinama u 
Hrvatskoj. Općenito se razlikuju dva oblika mira u multietničkim područjima. 
Prvi se odnosi na postojanje mira u mjestima koja su sačuvala svoj mir i inte-
gritet unatoč širenju etničkog nasilja u njihovu okruženju. Drugi je oblik mira 
mnogo češći, a odnosi se na čitavu ljestvicu postkonfliktnih procesa. Nadalje, 
predložena je tipologija koja razlikuje područja multietničkog mira i sukoba u 
Hrvatskoj, gdje se prvo odnosi na područja u kojima nije bilo nasilnih sukoba 
devedesetih, a potonje na područja u kojima se vraćaju izbjeglice, pretežno Srbi, 
kao posljedica sukoba devedesetih. Potom su prikazani odgovori koje su dali 
stručnjaci na nacionalnoj razini te lokalni vođe hrvatske i srpske nacionalnosti, 
kako bi se provjerila valjanost spomenute tipologije u njezinoj osnovi, tj. razli-
kovanje konfliktnih i nekonfliktnih područja nastanjenih i Hrvatima i Srbima. 
Na koncu, predložena su dva glavna zaključka. Prvi se tiče relevantnosti osnovne 
dihotomije multietničkih područja, a drugi moguće korisnosti pristupa (sa staja-
lišta koncepta) ovisnosti o prijeđenom putu u cilju objašnjenja razlike između 
konfliktnih i mirnih područja u slučaju Hrvatske.
Ključne riječi: multietnička područja, sukobi, mir, tipologija, Hrvatska, ovisnost 
o prijeđenom putu
